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During the 1970s, military planners east and west of the “Iron Curtain” 
continued to prepare for a potential “hot” conflict between the two 
opposing military alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Then-divided Germany – called the 
Central Region by NATO – would have been the main battleground of 
such a conflict. But how would that Third World War, and especially its 
conventional side, be fought? In NATO’s realm, this question not only 
occupied the thinking of military headquarters and national defence 
ministries, but also that of other military “experts.” The resulting often 
international textual discourse ranged from military doctrine to news-
paper articles to future histories, that mirrored not only the change of 
strategy from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” but also intra-
alliance issues such as equitable sharing of the military burden and the 
influence of latest weapons technology on strategy and tactics. And 
while World War III between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance 
never materialized, both sides spent billions on materiel and stationed 
millions of soldiers in preparations for a war that never happened and 
that continues to stimulate imaginations of war up to this day.
It is a sunny and quiet morning somewhere along the border between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. 
All of a sudden, delta-winged MiG-21 fighter jets thunder overhead from 
east to west. Then, a platoon of Soviet T-62 tanks rumbles through an 
opening in the East German border defences and enters West German 
territory, followed by BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. A few hundred 
metres into the federal state of Hesse, Federal Republic of Germany, the 
armored column passes through a narrow point between two hills. This 
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is the chance for a dug-in Bundeswehr anti-tank team: from their cam-
ouflaged position, the soldiers fire a HOT anti-tank guided missile at the 
leading Soviet T-62. World War III has begun.1
Third World War scenarios like this were common in 1970s west-
ern print media. But why? After all, the years between 1970 and 1979 
are often seen as the period of détente or Entspannungspolitik between 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. 
This rapprochement between “East” and “West” was symbolized by high-
level talks between Washington and Moscow, the Federal Republic of 
Germany’s Ostpolitik, and the final Helsinki Accords of the 1975 Confer-
ence on Security and Co-Operation in Europe.2 But the Cold War in 
Europe was far from over.3 To the contrary, military planners on both 
sides of the “Iron Curtain” continued to prepare for a potential “hot” con-
flict between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.4 The main 
battleground, designated the Central Region in NATO parlance, would 
be (then-)divided Germany.5 How, though, would that Third World War 
be fought? In NATO’s realm, this question not only occupied military 
headquarters and national defence ministries, but also other experts, 
producing an international textual discourse that ranged from military 
doctrines to newspaper articles, to even future histories of World War III. 
These debates reflect a typical aspect of the Cold War, namely trying to 
1 War begins only with the defence of the attacked, Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege 
(München: Ullstein, 2002).
2 Robert D. Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon-Ford Years, 1969–1976,” The Cambridge His-
tory of the Cold War, Vol. II, Crises and Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
(Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 373–394; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Détente 
in Europe, 1962–1976,” ibid., 198–218.
3 Dieter Krüger, Am Abgrund? Das Zeitalter der Bündnisse: Nordatlantische Allianz und 
Warschauer Pakt 1947 bis 1991 (Fulda: Parzellers, 2013) for a recent history on the conflict 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
4 Dieter Krüger (ed.), Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap: Strategien und Operationspläne der Bündnisse 
im Kalten Krieg (Fulda: Parzellers, 2015), with articles on the preparations for war on both 
sides.
5 The Central Region consisted of (West) Germany south of Schleswig-Holstein (which was 
part of the Northern Region) to the Bavarian–Austrian border. For recent contributions to the 
historiography of the NATO “flanks,” see Bernd Lemke (ed.), Periphery or Contact Zone? The 
NATO Flanks 1961 to 2013 (Freiburg im Breisgau et al.: Rombach, 2015) and Bernd Lemke, Die 
Allied Mobile Force 1961 bis 2002 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015).
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guess the intentions of the potential adversary,6 and they also show how 
the then-current state of the NATO alliance and its military capabilities 
were seen at the time in its member states.
Among Western European visions of World War III in the 1970s, 
especially those of three NATO generals were very prominent: Robert 
Close of Belgium, Johannes Steinhoff of West Germany, and Sir John 
Hackett of the United Kingdom.7 They were the loudest voices in an 
international and public discourse about NATO’s military capabilities in 
which outlooks on a potential war with the Warsaw Pact were informed 
by World War II, the peacetime experience of NATO as a defensive mili-
tary alliance, and estimations on the future role and use of latest-genera-
tion weaponry.8 To further narrow down my focus, I will, for the most 
6 E.g. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Briefing “NATO–Warsaw Pact Balance,” 24 
September 1975, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/
library/readingroom/, 20 September 2016, 1: “[…] the perceptions each has of the capabilities 
of its potential adversary and of the nature of the conflict that is envisaged.”
7 E.g. C. L. Sulzberger, “No Farce the Second Time,” New York Times, 5 June 1977, E17: “The 
“Swiss Review of World Affairs” prints an analysis based on books published last year by two 
retired NATO generals [...] “Europe Without Defense? 48 Hours That Could Change the Face of 
the World” [and] “Where is NATO headed” […].”; Drew Middleton, “NATO Forces: Criticism 
Gains New Urgency,” The New York Times, 4 November 1979, 9: “[...] criticisms of [NATO’s] 
military inadequacies, the present strategy or lack of it for defending Europe and the imbalance 
between the overall United States contribution and that of the European partners are growing 
in volume and severity. A sense of urgency has been introduced into the debate by Gen. Robert 
Close, a distinguished Belgian soldier, who on the basis of a mass of detailed information about 
both sides maintains that in 48 hours the Soviet Union and its allies could smash through the 
Rhine and seize the Ruhr industrial basin without recourse to nuclear arms.” For West German 
visions of nuclear World War III in the 1950s, see Andy Hahnemann, “Keiner kommt davon. 
Der Dritte Weltkrieg in der deutschen Literatur der 50er Jahre,” Keiner Kommt davon. Zeit-
geschichte in der Literatur nach 1945, ed. Erhard Schütz and Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 151–165. For Warsaw Pact visions, see Central Intelligence 
Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, Warsaw Pact Commentary on NATO Concepts 
for War in Central Europe, October 1977, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/, 20 September 2016, I. East German visions of 
World War III and the GDR press’ point of view on NATO’s state of defence are a desideratum 
of my research.
8 Siegfried Lautsch, “Die Entwicklung der militärischen Konzeption der Warschauer Ver-
tragsorganisation in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten des Ost–West-Konflikts,” – Schlachtfeld Fulda 
Gap, 87–113, here 92f: “Beide Seiten stützten sich auf ihre Erfahrungen und Lehren des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges, auf Stellvertreterkriege der Nachkriegszeit und auf die Weiterentwicklung ihrer 
Streitkräfte entsprechend den operativ-strategischen Erkenntnissen im 20. Jahrhundert.”
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part, leave out nuclear warfare and concentrate on conventional defence, 
especially concerning land and air warfare in central Europe.9
The 1970s were a decade of profound changes in military affairs.10 
Already in 1967, concurrently with the so-called “Harmel Report” call-
ing for a twin-pillar strategy of deterrence/defence and détente, NATO 
decided on the strategy of flexible response.11 The new strategy was set 
down in document MC 14/3.12 Flexibility of response superseded MC 
48 of 1954 and its strategy of a “devastating counter-attack employ-
ing atomic weapons.”13 Instead, from the late 1960s, NATO wanted “to 
provide for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area primarily by 
a credible deterrence, effected by confronting any possible, threatened 
or actual aggression, ranging from covert operations to all-out nuclear 
war […].”14 The main goal of the Atlantic Alliance was to credibly deter 
any enemy (read: the Warsaw Pact) and show him that no attack would be 
worth the outcome of his aggression. Deterrence, or eventually defence 
in the case of war (in German, called the Ernstfall, “case of emergency,” 
or Verteidigungsfall, “case of defence”), was based on the triad of con-
ventional forces, tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, and strategic 
atomic arms. To achieve a credible deterrence or a successful defence 
along the lines of flexible response, it was especially NATO’s conven-
tional forces that needed to be modernized. In the 1950s and 1960s, they 
had mostly served the function of a trip-wire for massive nuclear retali-
ation. Now, in the 1970s, renewed emphasis was put on conventional 
9 For nuclear options, see e.g. Kurt J. Lauk, Die nuklearen Optionen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979); Christian Tuschhoff, Deutschland, Kernwaf-
fen und die NATO 1949–1967 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002).
10 E.g. Gordon S. Barrass, “The Renaissance in American Strategy and the Ending of the Great 
Cold War,” Military Review 1 (2010): 101–110, here 103.
11 North Atlantic Council, The Future Tasks of the Alliance, 14 December 1967, http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm, March 14, 2017.
12 North Atlantic Military Committee, MC 14/3 (Final), 16 January 1968 – NATO Strategy 
Documents 1949–1969, ed. Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/
a680116a.pdf, 18 September 2016.
13 North Atlantic Military Committee, M.C. 48 (Final), 22 November 1954 – NATO Strategy 
Documents 1949–1969, ed. Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/
a541122a.pdf, 18 September 2016.
14 MC 14/3.
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warfare.15 NATO needed to field, or was already fielding, new genera-
tions of conventional military materiel to back up the strategy of flex-
ible response or to replace outdated materiel, especially guided anti-tank, 
anti-aircraft, and air-to-ground munitions, as well as airplanes and main 
battle tanks.
For nuclear warfare, NATO relied especially and mostly on the United 
States of America’s arsenal. The U.S. had enjoyed a lead in atomic arms 
in the early years of the Cold War after 1945. By 1970, though, the Soviet 
Union had almost reached nuclear parity with the USA. In this state of 
near equilibrium, actual atomic war certainly meant “mutually assured 
destruction.” This was another reason why conventional warfare received 
renewed emphasis through flexible response – a war below the level of 
nuclear escalation seemed to become more likely again.16
In terms of conventional forces, the Warsaw Pact and especially the 
Soviet Union enjoyed numerical superiority throughout the Cold War, at 
least in terms of combat units.17 For example, according to some read-
ings that included both active and reserve forces, about 43,000 Warsaw 
Pact tanks faced 14,000 NATO tanks in 1975, a ratio of 3 to 1; in terms 
of manpower, about 950,000 Warsaw Pact troops faced 790,000 NATO 
soldiers.18
Moreover, with American involvement in Southeast Asia in the 
1960s and the early 1970s, U.S. soldiers were withdrawn from Western 
15 Consult the various articles in Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap.
16 Ibid.
17 E.g. NATO–Warsaw Pact Balance, 1.
18 Michael Poppe, “Zum militärischen Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Nordatlantischer Allianz 
und Warschauer Pakt,” – Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap, 254–284. A Central Intelligence Agency 
Directorate of Intelligence July 1975 research paper called Flexibility in Soviet Offensive Forces: 
The Roles of Armor and Other Ground Forces, 5f, puts the tank numbers at about 25,100 for 
the Warsaw Pact and 6,000 for NATO. The balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact was and still is a complicated topic, see NATO–Warsaw Pact Balance; Wallace J. Thies, The 
Atlantic Alliance, Nuclear Weapons & European Attitudes: Reexamining the Conventional Wis-
dom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 15ff.; John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The 
Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Defense Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); 
Frederick Zilian Jr., “The Shifting Military Balance in Central Europe,” – The United States and 
Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, Vol. 2, 1968–1990, ed. Detlef 
Junker (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004), 155–162.
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Europe, much to the chagrin of the European allies who felt that the USA 
neglected the “real” centre of the Cold War. And on the other side of the 
Atlantic, already during the Vietnam War and especially after the loss of 
South Vietnam, voices in the United States Congress grew louder and 
louder that wanted a partial or even complete withdrawal of GIs from 
Europe, arguing that “the” West Europeans felt safe under the American 
nuclear umbrella and were not doing enough themselves in terms of mili-
tary materiel and manpower. The question of fair burden-sharing of the 
common defence in the Atlantic Alliance was once again raised.19
In addition, the Soviet Union was modernizing its forces at a fast rate 
in the 1960s and 1970s.20 NATO, which had always tried to even out its 
numerical disadvantage through technological superiority, saw this mili-
tary build-up as a threat.21 This added additional pressure on the alliance 
to modernise its non-nuclear war-fighting capabilities.
The contemporary conflict that seemed to predict the most how a 
potential Third World War would be fought was the October 1973 Mid-
dle East War. It pitted the latest generation of Soviet- and U.S.-produced 
weaponry against each other, such as S-75 “Dvina” (NATO designation 
SA-2 “Guideline”) surface-to-air missiles against F-4 Phantom II fighter-
bomber jets or 9M14 “Malyutka” (NATO designation AT-3 “Sagger”) 
anti-tank guided missiles against M60 main battle tanks.22 From the 
19 See especially Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
20 E.g. Sherwood S. Cordier, Calculus of Power: The Current Soviet–American Conventional 
Military Balance in Central Europe, Third Edition (Washington, D.C.: University Press of Amer-
ica, 1980); David R. Stone, “The Military,” – The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, ed. Richard 
H. Immermann and Petra Goedde (Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2013), 352.
21 E.g. NATO–Warsaw Pact Balance, 1. For an overview of debates about the military balance, 
see David M. Walsh, The Military Balance in the Cold War: U.S. Perceptions and Policy, 1976–85 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2008).
22 Ulrich de Maizière, Verteidigung in Europa-Mitte (München: J. F. Lehmanns, 1975), 35. 
Lemke, Allied Mobile Force, 36 claims that the 1973 October War confirmed Western military 
planners’ ideas on the use of guided weapons. Consult also Saul Bronfeld, “Fighting Outnum-
bered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army,” The Journal of Military History 
71:2 (April 2007): 465–498; Ingo Trauschweizer, “Learning with an Ally: The U.S. Army and 
the Bundeswehr in the Cold War,” The Journal of Military History 72:2 (April 2008): 477–508, 
especially 498.
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Vietnam War, military planners took the lessons of using helicopters 
for transportation and supporting ground troops as well as the need for 
close-air support by specialized jet planes.23
But how could flexible response and the modernization of NATO’s 
conventional arsenal be implemented? This was a question of money as 
well as of interpretation. Western Europe faced the end of the post-World 
War II boom years.24 Defence spending had to cope with higher inflation 
rates and more national debts as well as higher manpower and equip-
ment costs.25 In addition, debates raged among NATO members about 
how flexible response was to be interpreted and especially when the 
nuclear threshold would be crossed, and therefore when the point of time 
would arrive at which atomic weapons were to be used. The United States 
wanted to delay a nuclear confrontation as long as possible and there-
fore fight a prolonged conventional conflict. But some Europeans wanted 
a lower nuclear threshold as a more credible deterrent; they feared that 
conventional warfare would make an attack more attractive to the Soviet 
Union because of its seeming advantages in this field.26 And last but not 
least, Europeans still remembered the destruction of their countries in 
World War II.
These discussions did not only take place in military staff rooms and 
government ministries in Brussels, London, Bonn, or Washington27; they 
were also hotly debated in publicly available print media. It is here that the 
names of the earlier mentioned Generals Robert Close, Johannes Stein-
hoff, and Sir John Hackett showed up. The three of them shared being 
long-serving career soldiers with military records spanning from World 
War II to high positions in NATO. All of them were weary of détente 
between East and West; all of them saw deficiencies in NATO that needed 
23 Cordier, Soviet–American Conventional Military Balance; Ingo Trauschweizer, “Back to the 
Cold War: The U.S. Army after Vietnam,” U.S. Military History Review 2:1 (December 2015): 
18–37.
24 The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez 
Manela and Daniel J. Sargent (Cambridge, MA et al.: Belknap, 2010).
25 See especially Thies, Friendly Rivals.
26 See especially Robert de Wijk, Flexibility in Response? Attempts to Construct a Plausible 
Strategy for NATO 1959–1989 (dissertation, Rijksuniversitet Leiden, 1989).
27 See e.g. Bundeswehr General Ulrich de Maizière's Verteidigung in Europa-Mitte.
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to be overcome; and all of them wanted to convince the national publics 
of their home countries (and also the NATO public in general) to invest 
more in the common defense of the Atlantic Alliance.
Belgian General Robert Close had been commander of a Belgian 
unit stationed in West Germany and was, in the mid-1970s, director of 
NATO’s Defence College in Rome. In 1975, he published L’europe sans 
défense? (“Europe without Defence?”), later translated into other lan-
guages, including German.28 In this book, Close described NATO as 
being unprepared for a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. He mistrusted 
the Soviets and feared that the USSR had secret plans running counter to 
détente. Especially the Soviet military buildup suggested more than just a 
defensive capability. Close thought that if the Soviets saw an opportunity 
for reaching certain political goals via limited military means, hawkish 
politicians and generals in Moscow would wage war against the Atlantic 
Alliance. In one chapter, he describes his vision of World War III: Warsaw 
Pact forces would be able to reach the Rhine in 48 hours while NATO’s 
conventional forces were unprepared for repelling this attack. Close felt 
that especially the armed forces of the smaller allies, such as his native 
Belgium, were too weak, cutting both manpower numbers and defence 
spending. He blamed this on the false impression détente had allegedly 
created among Western European politicians and publics, making them 
believe that there would be no military conflict and therefore no need 
to prepare for a war with the Warsaw Pact anymore. Moreover, Robert 
Close had experienced Nazi Germany’s Blitzkrieg in 1940 against his 
own country. He was haunted by the possibility of being caught off guard 
again. Close presented several improvements for NATO’s conventional 
capabilities. One was a better dislocation of military forces: many NATO 
troops in the “layer cake” of forces from 7 countries were positioned too 
far away from the intra-German border.29 Close also called for greater 
manpower reserves. Finally, he took a stand for more latest generation 
weapon technology as well as shared research, development, and procure-
28 Robert Close, Europa ohne Verteidigung? 48 Stunden, die das Gesicht der Welt verändern 
(Bad Honnef et al.: Osang, 1977).
29 Troops from the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France.
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ment of weapons systems among the allies to save money and streamline 
military logistics. This latter topic of rationalization, standardization, and 
interoperability (RSI) to improve NATO’s capabilities was also one of the 
very hotly debated topics among the Atlantic Alliance’s members in the 
1970s (and beyond).30 Other high-ranking active duty NATO officers 
were quick to state that the situation was not as bleak and Close had mis-
represented it.31
German General Johannes Steinhoff had been a World War II fighter 
ace and was scarred for life in a 1945 jet plane crash. Influential in building 
up the West German Luftwaffe after rearmament, he was the Bundeswehr 
air force’s commander-in-chief (Inspekteur der Luftwaffe) from 1966 to 
1970. From 1971 to 1974, Steinhoff headed the NATO Military Commit-
tee – the highest position a military officer can gain in the alliance. He 
commanded a very conspicuous presence in West German media, from 
interviews and articles in newspapers and magazines, to forewords in 
publications on international security issues.32 In 1976, two years after 
his resignation from the military, he published Wohin treibt die NATO? 
(“Where is NATO heading?”).33 Steinhoff came to conclusions about the 
state of the Atlantic Alliance similar to Close, but the German ex-general 
went into more detail in some respects, such as the question of the nuclear 
threshold and how reliable the United States would be in the eventuality 
of a Warsaw Pact attack. Steinhoff put special emphasis on the fact that 
NATO needed a strong European pillar to keep the Americans in, as well 
as make burden-sharing of the common defense more equal. He argued 
30 See e.g. Benedict von Bremen, “Technology, Warfare, and Intra-Alliance Rivalry: The U.S.-
West German Main Battle Tank Harmonization in the 1970s,” – The Means to Kill: Essays on 
the Interdependence of War and Technology from Ancient Rome to the Age of Drones, ed. Gerrit 
Dworok and Frank Jacob (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2016), 210–227; Keith Hartley, NATO 
Arms Co-Operation: A Study in Economics and Politics (London et al.: George Allen & Unwin, 
1983); Walsh, The Military Balance, 120; Lemke, Allied Mobile Force, 35.
31 See e.g. Drew Middleton, “US. Army in Germany Confident It Is in Fighting Form,” The 
New York Times, 15 May 1978, A2.
32 E.g. “‘Um Gottes willen, was für ein Kriegsbild’ – General a.D. Johannes Steinhoff über den 
Zustand der Nato,” Der Spiegel, 8 March 1976, 39–42.
33 Johannes Steinhoff, Wohin treibt die NATO? Probleme der Verteidigung Westeuropas (Ham-
burg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976).
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that Europeans should throw off the singlemindedness of national inter-
ests and work more closely together.34 Both Robert Close and Johannes 
Steinhoff felt that NATO was in a state of crisis. In their eyes, the alliance 
needed stronger decision-making institutions, making it less like a club 
of “the fifteen” where members have common interests but do not have 
binding rules. Like Close, Steinhoff heavily stressed that NATO’s conven-
tional arsenal needed improvement to either credibly deter or, should the 
need arise, successfully defend the Alliance against a possible Warsaw 
Pact attack. And like Close, Steinhoff did not completely trust the process 
of détente and questioned the sincerity of the Soviet Union’s intentions.35
British General Sir John Hackett was also a World War II veteran, 
having fought in the failed 1944 Allied Operation Market Garden. He 
continued to serve Her Majesty in the post-World War II era and was 
commander of the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany in the 
mid-1960s. During this tenure, he won a NATO war game playing the 
military commander of the Warsaw Pact. This prompted Hackett to write 
an open letter to The Times London in which he criticized the state of 
the British armed forces.36 After his retirement, Hackett was approached 
by a publisher and requested to write a fictional history of the Third 
World War. With the help of other military experts – some of them also 
recently retired and others remaining unknown due to their active ser-
vice status  – The Third World War: August 1985. A Future History was 
published in 1978 and subsequently translated into ten languages, selling 
three million copies worldwide, receiving an update with the 1982 The 
Third World War: The Untold Story, and allegedly being bedtime litera-
ture of U.S. presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.37 In Hackett’s 
34 A working example at the time was the Eurogroup, an informal meeting of the European 
NATO members (except for France, Iceland, and Portugal). The Eurogroup tried to show that 
the Europeans were actually doing more for the common defence by fostering intra-European 
defence cooperation and increased defence spending, see e.g. The Eurogroup (Brussels: NATO 
Information Service, 1976); Krüger, Am Abgrund, 135.
35 For a summary of Steinhoff 's oft-reiterated points, Lemke, Allied Mobile Force, 34f.
36 “Defining the True Purpose of NATO: What Should Be Understood, from General Sir John 
Hackett, Commander, Northern Army Group,” The Times, 6 February 1968, 9.
37 Sir John Hackett and others, The Third World War: August 1985. A Future History (Lon-
don: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978). One of the translations was in German: Der Dritte Weltkrieg. 
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1978 scenario, a conflict over the succession to Yugoslav leader Josip Broz 
Tito evolves into World War III, with the Warsaw Pact attacking NATO. 
After two weeks of heavy conventional fighting in the Central Region, 
the Atlantic Ocean, proxy wars elsewhere around the globe, and combat 
even in space, NATO barely manages to turn the tide against the mas-
sive armored onslaught from the East. The Soviet Union then destroys 
Birmingham with one nuclear weapon, which is followed by a retalia-
tory Anglo-American atomic attack on Smolensk, resulting in the sud-
den disintegration of the Soviet Union. The moral of Hackett’s story was 
that NATO countries needed to invest more in defence now – that is, the 
late 1970s – before it would be too late – that is, when the Warsaw Pact 
would possibly attack in the future.38 Like Close and Steinhoff, Hackett 
mistrusted détente and wanted more defence spending, especially by the 
United Kingdom but also by the other NATO members. He also shared 
the same view that the already fragile conventional military balance in 
Europe was in danger. In comparison with actual NATO estimates and 
war plans of the time, this future history of World War III seems very 
close to what could have turned into the “real deal.”39 On the other hand, 
Hauptschauplatz Deutschland (München: Bertelsmann, 1978). For sales numbers and the 
book’s reception, see Tom Nicholson, “Souls and Salvos,” Newsweek, 12 March 1979, 23; Sir 
John Hackett, “Why the General Is Refighting World War III,” The Times, 19 June 1982, 10; 
Ronald Dugger, “The President’s Favorite Book: ‘The Third World War,’” The Nation, 27 Octo-
ber 1984.
38 See also a National Security Information Memorandum “Warning of War in Europe,” 27 June 
1984, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/read-
ingroom/, 20 September 2016, 6: “We believe it highly unlikely that the Pact would attack NATO 
under present circumstances. […] We believe war in Europe would become likely only as a result 
of profound political, military, economic, or social changes—or a serious miscalculation—and 
would be preceded by a period of growing tension resulting in a crisis of great severity.” [Italics in 
original.]
39 Except that the Warsaw Pact planned, should the need arise, to use tactical nuclear weap-
ons from the outset, Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap; The Roles of Armor and Other Ground Forces; 
Warsaw Pact Commentary on NATO Concepts; Director of Central Intelligence, Warsaw Pact 
Forces Opposite NATO, National Intelligence Estimate Volume I—Summary Estimate, 31 Janu-
ary 1979, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/, 20 September 2016; Michael Schmid, “Nukleares Skalpell oder Damoklesschw-
ert? Strategiediskussionen und Militärkonzepte der NATO und der USA in Zeiten von ‘Flexible 
Response’, Doppelbeschluss und PD-59 (1968–1980)” http://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/
opus4/files/538/Schmid_Strategiediskussion_NATO_USA.pdf; Michael Schmid, “Transatlanti-
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real world events in the years to follow quickly outdated some of Hackett’s 
predictions (in The Third World War, Persia is one of the most important 
non-NATO allies – only months after the publication of the book, the 
Iranian Revolution took place and reversed that situation 180 degrees). 
Interestingly, West German weekly Der Spiegel listed The Third World 
War under non-fiction (and also published excerpts from the German 
translation40) while The New York Times put it on its fiction bestseller list.
The manifold contributors to Hackett’s work mirror the various 
experts from the military, defense and state departments, news media, 
and defence industry that participated in the debates on NATO’s mili-
tary capabilities in the 1970s.41 Their outlets ranged from newspapers 
to defence industry magazines.42 German weekly newsmagazine Der 
Spiegel printed a title story asking if the West was strong enough.43 Bet-
ter defence cooperation among the NATO allies was a recurrent topic 
in newspapers and magazines such as The New York Times, The Times 
London, as well as scholarly publications.44 There even was a 1978 West 
German TV mockumentary on the Third World War.45 Combined, these 
sche und mittelöstliche Krisenbögen. Die US-Sicherheitspolitik im Zweiten Kalten Krieg zwi-
schen NATO-Modernisierung und Carter-Doktrin – und ihre Einschätzung durch die östliche 
Spionage (1977–1985)“ http://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/files/587/Schmid_Carter-
Doktrin_und_NATO.pdf. A more pessimistic assessment is Lemke, Allied Mobile Force, e.g. 84.
40 Serialized in the Der Spiegel issues 30 October 1978, 6 November 1978 and 13 November 
1978.
41 See the blurb on the dustcover: “General Hackett has been assisted in writing this book by 
experts of the highest calibre (some anonymously), including top-ranking American and Ger-
man generals. Contributors include: Air Chief Marshal […] Brigadier […] Vice-Admiral […] 
deputy editor of The Economist […] Major-General […] Ambassador […] and Permanent 
Representative on the NATO Council [...]”
42 For the former, see e.g. “‘Das muß uns besorgt machen’ – Nato-Oberbefehlshaber Haig über 
die sowjetische Militärmacht und die Stärke des Westens,” Der Spiegel, 16 August 1976, 79–87; 
“Soviet Bloc’s Forces Are More Mobile,” The Times, 10 December 1974, 5; for the latter, e.g. 
Hans Rühle, “Mehr Sicherheit durch weniger Truppen?” Wehr und Wirtschaft 2 (1974): 79–80.
43 “Ist der Western stark genug?” Der Spiegel, 16 August 1976.
44 See e.g. “Wüstes Durcheinander,” Der Spiegel, 9 June 1975, 36–38; C.L. Sulzberger, “A 
Smaller Bang for a Buck,” The New York Times, 21 November 1976, 179, quoting Steinhoff: 
“As an alliance of sovereign countries competing with each other economically, NATO reflects 
the economic, industrial and political situation in each member country, and this in turn has 
repercussions in the great variety of projects and weapons.”
45 Martin Schulze, Frieden ist der Ernstfall, ARD, 6 June 1977, 9:45 p.m.
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texts formed a discourse about how the next war in Europe would be 
fought – or at least how NATO should effectively prepare for it.46
All these visions of World War III shared many similarities. Most 
experts expected the Soviet Union to take the opportunity to attack 
NATO during a time of political crisis, either in the Warsaw Pact or among 
NATO allies. Pact forces would either attack the Western Alliance from 
a “standing start,” that is, suddenly from military maneuvers, or give up 
the moment of surprise by a longer-term buildup of troops. The offensive 
would develop as follows: helicopters would deploy paratroopers in order 
to conquer important infrastructure such as military headquarters, radar 
installations, airports, and bridges in the hinterland; other infrastructure 
would be attacked by ground support aircraft in order to stifle NATO’s 
defence. Fighter jets would try to achieve air superiority. Under heavy 
artillery fire, armored and mechanized columns would drive deeply into 
Western German territory to reach the River Rhine – or even farther – 
as quickly as possible, most likely through the avenues of the Northern 
German Plain and the “Fulda Gap” in the state of Hesse in the heart of 
Germany. Soviet forces were depicted as a well-oiled but somewhat rigid 
war machine geared for fighting a reckless blitzkrieg.47
On the other side, NATO’s forces were usually seen as a mixed bag. 
Especially smaller allies with few troops in Western Germany, such as 
the Netherlands and Belgium, were considered weak parts in the Cen-
tral Region’s “layer cake.” In contrast, the Bundeswehr, the U.S. Armed 
Forces, and, to a lesser extent, British troops were deemed well-trained 
and equipped (especially West German and American troops were 
undergoing extensive materiel modernization and troop reorganization 
at the time and well into the 1980s).48 NATO forces were expected to 
46 There were also criticisms of Hackett, Steinhoff, Close, and other NATO officers as war-
mongers, e.g. Gerhard Kade, Die Bedrohungslüge: Zur Legende von der “Gefahr aus dem Osten” 
(Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1981); in Gerhard Kade, Generale für den Frieden (Köln: Pahl-Rugen-
stein, 1981), the interviewed former NATO generals doubted that war was imminent at the 
time and took an opposite position to Close et al.
47 For a study of some actual plans from both sides, see Schlachtfeld Fulda Gap, and Lemke, 
Allied Mobile Force.
48 See Walsh, The Military Balance, 122; Trauschweizer, “Learning with an Ally”; Trausch-
weizer, “Back to the Cold War.” For the Bundeswehr up to 1970, consult Helmut R. Hamme-
219Imagining the Third World War
Id
ea
 o
f t
he
 co
m
m
an
de
r o
f t
he
 5
. A
rm
y o
f t
he
 P
eo
pl
e’s
 A
rm
y o
f t
he
 G
er
m
an
 D
em
oc
ra
tic
 R
ep
ub
lic
 (N
VA
) f
or
 d
efe
ns
iv
e  
an
d 
off
en
siv
e o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 in
 1
98
3 
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 1
st 
fro
nt
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 th
e G
ro
up
 o
f S
ov
iet
 F
or
ce
s i
n 
G
er
m
an
y (
G
SS
D
). 
Co
ur
te
sy
: Z
en
tru
m
 fü
r M
ili
tä
rg
es
ch
ich
te
 u
nd
 S
oz
ia
lw
iss
en
sc
ha
fte
n 
de
r B
un
de
sw
eh
r
Od
er
W
es
er
E
lb
e
A
lle
r
NIEDERLANDE
VR
 P
O
LE
N
B
U
N
D
E
S
R
E
P
U
B
L
I
K
D
Ä
N
EM
A
R
K
D
E
U
T
S
C
H
L
A
N
D
D
E
U
T
S
C
H
E
D
E
M
O
K
R
A
T
I
S
C
H
E
R
E
P
U
B
L
I
K
M
SD
M
SD
PD
M
SD
8.
 M
SD
LS
tB
r
(G
S
S
D
)
5.
 A
rm
ee
 (N
VA
)
9.
 P
D
20
. M
SD
19
. M
SD
A
us
ga
ng
Ta
g 
4
A
us
ga
ng
Ta
g 
5 
- 7
8.
 M
SD
20
. M
SD 19
. M
SD
1.
 P
ol
n.
A
rm
ee
E
A
s 
(x
+2
)
5.
 A
R
FS
9.
 P
D
5.
 B
rM
S
5.
 R
B
r
5.
 R
B
r
5.
 IB
r
G
S
5.
 A
2.
 G
dP
A
(G
S
S
D
)9
. P
D
94
. G
dM
SD
(G
S
S
D
)
8.
, 1
9.
, 2
0.
 M
S
D
, 9
. P
D
 (N
VA
), 
13
8.
, 2
21
. s
. P
R
 (G
S
S
D
),
5.
 R
B
r (
N
VA
)
A
us
ga
ng
Ta
g 
3
A
us
ga
ng
Ta
g 
2
A
us
ga
ng
Ta
g 
1
W
R
W
R
8.
 M
SD
T.
/M
SR
1.
 P
ID
5.
 P
ID
I. 
A
rm
ee
ko
rp
s 
(N
L)
T.
/2
. M
ID
(U
S)
9.
 ID
(U
S)
61
. I
D
1.
 ID
(G
B
)
K
do
 O
st
se
ea
us
gä
ng
e 
(K
O
A
)
6.
 P
G
D
 (D
E
), 
Jü
tl.
D
iv.
 (D
K
), 
41
., 
61
. I
D
 (D
E
), 
1.
 ID
 (G
B
), 
R
A
B
-6
50
 (D
E
)
1.
, 4
., 
5.
 P
ID
, 1
01
. s
.IB
r, 
R
A
B
-1
29
R
A
B
-
12
9
5.
 P
ID
10
1.
   
s.
IB
r
41
. I
D
R
A
B
-
65
0
Jü
tl.
 D
iv
.
6. PG
D
4. 
PI
D
H
SB
r-
51
9.
 P
D
1.
 P
ID
1.
 F
ro
nt
(G
S
S
D
/N
VA
)
O
K
 1
. F
ro
nt
(S
ta
b 
G
S
S
D
)
T.
/M
SR
M
ün
st
er
H
an
no
ve
r
M
ag
de
bu
rg
P
ot
sd
am
S
ch
w
er
in
R
os
to
ck
B
ux
te
hu
de
H
am
bu
rg
B
re
m
er
ha
ve
n
B
re
m
en
W
ilh
el
m
sh
av
en
G
ro
ni
ng
en
B
E
R
LI
N
K
ie
l
O
ld
en
bu
rg
Lü
ne
bu
rg
N
eu
m
ün
st
er
N
eu
br
an
de
nb
ur
g
W
itt
en
be
rg
e
G
ra
bo
w
Fr
ey
en
-
st
ei
n
W
is
m
ar
Lü
be
ck
D
em
m
in
K
üh
lu
ng
sb
or
n
N
eu
st
re
lit
z
O
ra
ni
en
bu
rg
C
riv
itz
O
sn
ab
rü
ck
B
ie
le
fe
ld
C
lo
pp
en
bu
rg
E
ns
ch
ed
e
H
itz
-
ac
ke
r
B
oi
ze
n-
bu
rg
E
ve
nd
or
f
U
el
ze
n
S
ch
ne
ve
rd
in
ge
n
W
in
se
n
N
ie
nb
ur
g
Lo
cc
um
U
ch
te
A
ha
us
B
oc
ho
lt
S
te
in
fu
rt
S
ch
le
sw
ig
W
ün
sd
or
f
S
tr
au
sb
er
g
B
ev
en
se
n
B
ie
ne
n-
Ve
rd
en
N
or
dh
or
n
K
ap
 A
rk
on
a
Te
m
pl
in
Le
nz
en
D
as
so
w
B
in
z
P
er
le
be
rg
Fü
rs
te
nb
er
g
P
ut
bu
s
S
aß
ni
tz
H
el
go
la
nd
N
o
r
d
s
e
e
O
s
t
s
e
e
bü
tte
l
G
ra
al
-M
ür
itz
S
zc
ze
ci
n
10
0 
km
50
0
Q
ue
lle
: S
ie
gf
rie
d 
La
ut
sc
h
ZM
SB
w
06
02
3-
17
©
Id
ee
 d
es
 B
ef
eh
ls
ha
be
rs
 d
er
 5
. A
rm
ee
 d
er
 N
VA
 fü
r d
ie
 A
ng
ri
ff
so
pe
ra
tio
n,
 1
98
3
220 Benedict von Bremen
repel the Warsaw Pact attack by a forward defence close to the intra-
German border, using highly mobile armored forces and well-prepared 
dug-in infantry anti-tank defences as well as close air support and keep-
ing air superiority. Still, most experts concurred that the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization would need to be better prepared to achieve success. 
In the worst case scenarios, the Atlantic Alliance is caught off guard, with 
the Warsaw Pact attacking during the summer holidays and on a Sunday 
morning when many Western soldiers would be on home leave. It was 
feared that NATO’s forces were equipped with outdated weapons and not 
supplied with enough reserves, both manpower and war stocks. Accord-
ing to Generals Close, Steinhoff, and Hackett as well as other experts, 
only investing more now – that is, in the 1970s – in the common defence 
of NATO, would help in the event of a future Warsaw Pact attack. Espe-
cially the Atlantic Alliance’s conventional forces should be modernized 
in terms of materiel. Troop levels should be at least kept at then-present 
levels or, even better, raised. The same went for defence spending: defence 
ministries’ budgets should not be reduced, instead being more efficiently 
spent or increased. This all would, in the eyes of the experts, either deter a 
war or aid defence in a “hot” conflict. The means to achieve this were seen 
in better defence cooperation through improved communications, joint 
training, and multinational defence production, as well as training more 
reservists and building up war stocks.
The Third World War between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, though, 
never materialized. After the stationing of new Soviet medium-range bal-
listic missiles and the 1979 NATO “double-track decision,” nuclear war-
fare took the spotlight again.49 Despite this, NATO’s conventional capa-
bilities were strengthened throughout the 1980s, reflecting the debates 
of the previous decade with their called-for improvements which were 
often implemented, although not always perfectly:50 new tanks such as 
rich et al., Das Heer 1950 bis 1970: Konzeption, Organisation, Aufstellung (München: R. Olden-
bourg, 2006).
49 See e.g. Lemke, Allied Mobile Force, 110.
50 Some short-lived initiatives were those like the 1977/78 NATO Long-Term Defense Pro-
gram. See especially Thies, The Atlantic Alliance; Cordier, Calculus of Power; Schlachtfeld Fulda 
Gap; Walsh, The Military Balance, 123. 
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the West German Leopard II and the American M-1 Abrams, attack heli-
copters like the Bundeswehr’s PAH-1 and the U.S. Army’s AH-64 Apache, 
close air support aircraft such as the U.S. Air Force A-10 Warthog II, 
new jet fighters like the F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Fighting Falcon, ground 
attack air planes like the West German-British-Italian Multi-Role Com-
bat Aircraft “Tornado,” more widespread introduction of multiple-rocket 
missile artillery, and the NATO-wide employed E-3 AWACS (Airborne 
Warning and Control System).51 In addition, more military stockpiles 
were gathered, more reservists enlisted, and more multinational training 
for increased interoperability conducted. Last but not least, continually 
adapted and modernized strategy and tactics like the United States 1982 
AirLand Battle concept also helped to improve NATO’s conventional 
capabilities52 – and cost a lot of Deutschmarks, Pounds Sterling, and U.S. 
Dollars, all for a war that never happened in reality.
But this is what the military does in peacetime: it prepares for war 
by equipping and training its forces. Like military exercises, one could 
see the visions of World War III in the 1970s as simulations. But the 
World War III visions of Close, Steinhoff, Hackett, and others were also 
especially meant as wake-up calls for more defence spending in order to 
strengthen NATO’s conventional forces in order to make flexible response 
more credible in the face of a threatening Soviet military buildup. These 
visions of a Third World War thereby not only shed light on how mod-
ern (conventional) warfare was envisioned during the 1970s, but they 
also reflect upon the debates that raged over NATO’s (conventional) state 
of military affairs – a state of affairs that was seen in dire need of being 
strengthened, despite (or even because) of détente. This was in tune with 
NATO’s roadmap in the guise of the 1967 “Harmel Report:” here, deter-
rence/defence and détente were not seen as mutually exclusive but as 
51 See e.g. Robert R. Tomes, US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: 
Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973–2003 (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 73.
52 See especially Tomes, US Defense Strategy on the development of the AirLand Battle doc-
trine; Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The NATO–Warsaw Pact Competition in the 1970s and 1980s: A 
Revolution in Military Affairs in the Making or the End of a Strategic Age?” Cold War History 
vol. 14 no. 4 (2014): 533–573; Krüger, Am Abgrund, 167ff.
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going hand in hand. With the oncoming of a “Second Cold War” in the 
late 1970s – Soviet Third World activity, the stationing of RSD-10 Pioneer 
(NATO designation SS-20 Saber) medium range ballistic missiles, and 
the year 1979 (Iranian Revolution, invasion of Afghanistan), the confron-
tation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact grew again, making scenarios 
like those of Close, Steinhoff, and Hackett more viable – and the need to 
prepare for them more urgent.53
Of these visions, Hackett’s “what if ” scenario perhaps had the most 
lasting effect. It spawned spin-offs, such as U.S. author Harold Doyle’s 
Team Yankee, a 1987 novel about an American tank platoon situated in 
Hackett’s vision of World War III.54 Three years later, when the Cold War 
was already coming to an end, Team Yankee the video game was pub-
lished; earlier years had seen both tabletop board games such as Fulda 
Gap: The First Battle of the Next War (1977) and other video games like 
the 1983 Germany 1985. And since the 2000s, several further computer 
games, such as the 2001 Operation Flashpoint: Cold War Crisis or the 
2012 Wargame: European Escalation have used World War III as the 
background for their scenarios. The visions of World War III between the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact continue.
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